La Natsu Bell's Burden Is Even Heavier, Performance Losses, Real Controlling Shares Are Almost Full Pledge.

Before the first half of a loss or 540 million yuan of performance warning, after the actual control of stock pledge default. The burden of "national dress" La Natsu Bell (06116) seems to be getting heavier and heavier.

On the night of August 6th, La Natsu Bell issued the notice on the default and risk warning of the actual controller's share pledge. The announcement shows that the shares of Xing Jiaxing, the controlling shareholder and actual controller of the company, have been lower than the minimum performance guarantee ratio, which may affect the stability of the control rights of listed companies. At present, xingjiaxing and Haitong Securities are still communicating to solve the problem of pledge default.

　　 Real controlling shares are almost full pledge.

As of the above announcement, Xing Xing directly owns 141 million 870 thousand shares of La Natsu Bell's limited sale conditions, accounting for 25.91% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 42.62% of the total share capital of the company's A shares.

On November 28, 2017 and December 2017 07, Xing Jiaxing mortgaged 35 million shares and 40 million shares of shares to Haitong Securities for stock pledge repurchase transactions for financing guarantee. Since then, xingjiaxing has pledged 15 million shares, 17 million shares, 25 million shares and 9 million 600 thousand shares of stock to Haitong Securities in September 18, 2018, October 17, 2018, January 31, 2019 and June 10, 2019 respectively as a supplementary pledge for the equity pledge repurchase transactions.

Notice shows that recently, the company received Xing Jiaxing notice, informed that its 2 stock pledge repurchase transactions with Haitong Securities performance guarantee ratio has been lower than the minimum performance guarantee ratio, stock pledge default. Up to now, xingjiaxing accumulatively pledged 141 million 600 thousand shares of the company, accounting for 25.85% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 42.54% of the total share capital of A shares, accounting for 99.81% of xingjiaxing's direct holding of the company's shares.

It is worth noting that, along with the above announcement, there is also a notice on the actual control of the joint action shareholder's supplementary pledge. The announcement shows that, due to the recent fluctuation in the stock price of the company, the Shanghai joint summer Investment Co., Ltd. of the company's actual controller (hereinafter referred to as "Shanghai summer") will add 6 million shares (1.10% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 1.80% of the total share capital of the A share) to the CITIC Securities, the initial date of the supplementary pledge is August 5, 2019, and the repurchase date is October 8, 2020.

At the same time, La Natsu Bell hinted at the relevant risks in the announcement, saying that if there is a risk of subsequent closing or default of pledge shares, Shanghai intends to take relevant measures such as raising funds and additional margin.

Up to now, Shanghai has 45 million 200 thousand shares of Limited sales conditions, accounting for 8.25% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 13.58% of the total share capital of A shares. After the above supplementary pledge, Shanghai shares 38 million 500 thousand shares of Pledged Shares, accounting for 7.03% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 11.57% of the total share capital of A shares, accounting for 85.17% of Shanghai 45 million 200 thousand shares. In addition, xingjiaxing and Shanghai sum summer accumulated 180 million shares of Pledged Shares, accounting for 32.88% of the total share capital of the company, accounting for 54.10% of the total share capital of A shares, accounting for 96.27% of xingjiaxing and Shanghai summer shares.

　　 There are many worries in stores.

Behind the actual control of people's mortgage default and the actual action of the people's supplementary pledge is La Natsu Bell's stock price which has continued to fall. Eastern wealth data showed that in October 2017, La Natsu Bell's share price had recently climbed to 29.75 yuan / share just after its listing, but then it opened a long bear road. At the beginning of this year, the company's stock price was 8.5 yuan / share, and by August 6th, La Natsu Bell's intraday share price was 4.96 yuan / share since its listing, which has dropped more than 83% compared with its highest point.

The downside of share price can not be separated from the company's performance. The company's 2018 annual report shows that the company achieved operating income of 10 billion 176 million yuan during the reporting period, representing a decrease of 269 million yuan over the same period last year, a decrease of 2.58% over the same period last year, and a net profit of about -1.6 billion yuan, representing a decrease of 658 million yuan compared with the same period last year, down 132% from the same period last year.

In this regard, the company acknowledged in the annual report that in addition to the external market environment, the first loss also revealed that the company's preparation for coping with changes in the external environment is not enough, and the response measures are not timely enough. The annual report pointed out: "the reason for the company's first annual operating loss is that, besides the decline in terminal sales and the decline in gross margin, it also reflects the urgent need to adjust the business development model of" multi brand and direct business ".

As a matter of fact, the low gross margin and low store efficiency are not new problems for La bell. Before its listing, the industry questioned its Ping efficiency. Cheng Weixiong, general manager of Shanghai Liang habitat Brand Management Co., Ltd. once pointed out that "La Natsu Bell's low Ping efficiency is obvious. Under the background of the market downturn, the company continues to raise funds to invest in the channel construction. It is not significant to make large-scale efforts through channel expansion. The urgent need for the company to upgrade is single store efficiency."

Reporters noted that the company's prospectus submitted in 2017 showed that the company intends to invest 1 billion 550 million yuan of investment funds for expansion of the retail network construction projects. Prospectus shows that from 2014 to 2016, the number of retail outlets was 6887, 7893 and 8902 respectively. It is worth noting that in the face of such a huge retail network, La Natsu Bell adopted a full direct business mode. By the end of 2016, the company had only 2 franchises.

The larger the retail network is, the more limited the performance growth is. From 2014 to 2016, the revenue of the company was 6 billion 290 million yuan, 7 billion 439 million yuan and 8 billion 551 million yuan respectively. If we estimate the single store performance, the average single store performance from 2014 to 2016 is 913 thousand and 300 yuan, 942 thousand and 300 yuan and 960 thousand and 600 yuan.

　　 Brand matrix still needs to be carding.

After listing, La Natsu Bell still chose to "run wild": by the end of 2017, the number of stores reached 9448, of which 1518 were closed, 2059 were newly opened, and 541 had been added to the whole year. By the end of 2018, the number of entity stores has reached 9269. It was in 2018 that the company had its first performance loss.

In 2019, the deficit continued. According to La Natsu Bell's first half performance notice, the net profit attributable to shareholders of Listed Companies in the first half of 2019 was -5.4 billion to -4.4 billion, while the net profit of the company was estimated to be -5.9 billion yuan to -4.9 billion yuan, which was about 418.5% to 364.5% lower than that in the first half of 2018.

At this point, La Natsu Bell, who was addicted to opening a shop, finally stepped on his foot brake: his performance forecast showed that as at the end of June 2019, the number of operating outlets within the company had been reduced by more than 2400 compared with the end of 2018. In the announcement, the company said that the company's business transformation, adjustment, reduction of efficiency and other measures are being actively promoted, but the actual effect still needs a certain time to be gradually reflected.

In Cheng Weixiong's view, La Natsu Bell's "big shop mode" is not terrible. The terrible thing is that the structure of goods is not enough to support the performance of big stores. "The big store mode under low Ping efficiency is a burden. La Natsu Bell has a lot of similar stores in the country, but when he enters the shop, he looks at it repeatedly. In addition, most of the stores are multi brand shops, men's clothing and women's clothing, but there is not much difference in consumers' experience, but labels are different, but products tend to be homogeneous.

Cheng Weixiong added: "the practice of multi brand collection is a trend, but not all brands are together. They need to personalize the brand DNA to cater to consumers."

A consumer who concerns La Natsu Bell for nine years also told reporters: "70% of my wardrobe clothes came from this brand. But after about five or six years ago, when the store logo was adjusted, the design style of the whole brand deviated from the beauty of my old customer, especially when I went into the store in the past two years, I could hardly pick out a favorite dress. From my personal point of view, the biggest feeling is that the sub brand positioning is not clear, and the audience's identity of La Natsu Bell is scattered. Two, there is a lack of memory points in clothing design, and the three is to strengthen the differences and exclusiveness in brand value.

There are more than nine thousand stores, including nearly twenty sub brands. La Natsu Bell, founded in 1998, has won a lot of money in the local market. But in the current situation, the company is paying a price for the "run away" before this. How much will the market leave to La Natsu Bell?